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In this paper, we consider the implications of applying the city region concept to a medium-sized
city and whether such an application of a spatial and governmental policy is appropriate when the
central city in question is also not necessarily economically dominant or connected to its wider
city-region. This gives a deeper understanding to the process of subnational restructuring of the
UK state via the production of city regions which has now been in progress since the 2010
Coalition Government. The primary focus governmentally and in academic literature has been on
larger (English) city regions, but here we highlight how this has been applied in distinctive ways in
devolved nations of the UK. To this end, we focus upon the case of the Swansea Bay City Region,
based in South West Wales, looking through the lens of Welsh devolution and through the
concept of the city-region as a scalar narrative for the delivery of economic development.
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This City Deal will provide the region and
its partners with the new ways of working
and resources to unlock significant economic
growth across the Swansea Bay City
Region. It is a Deal where both Welsh
and UK Governments have committed to
jointly invest, subject to the submission
and approval of full business cases in rela-
tion to the eleven identified projects and
the agreement of governance arrangements
for the deal, up to £241 million on specific
interventions which seek to support and
further build on the region’s strengths
which include health, energy and
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manufacturing sectors and are under-
pinned by a world-class digital infrastruc-
ture, successful universities and innovative
health boards. (HM Government, 2017: 3)
Introduction
In this paper, we consider the implications
of applying the city-region concept to a
medium-sized city and whether such an
application of a spatial and governmental
policy is appropriate when the central city
in question is also not necessarily econom-
ically dominant or connected to its wider
city-region. This raises the wider question
that within the process of sub-nation state
restructuring, how can the city-region con-
struct deal with its application in what are
often ‘relational’ and ‘stretched’ (MacLeod
and Jones, 2007) polycentric city-regional
contexts. We focus on the case of the
Swansea Bay City Region (SBCR), based
in South West Wales, observed through
the lens of Welsh devolution and through
the concept of the city-region as a scalar
narrative for the delivery of economic
development.
This paper suggests that as a concept for
delivering economic growth in Wales, the
‘fit’ of the city-region concept to Swansea
Bay pushes the very essence and dynamics
of the economic model in question to its
spatial limits, hence the title. This is ques-
tioned via comprehending how and why the
scale and differences across the SBCR
stretch the spatial construct of city-region
building. Swansea as a smaller, geographi-
cally peripheral UK metropolitan centre
lacks economic dominance over a city-
region, which is polycentric and porous in
its social and spatial nature. This means it
struggles to embed the dynamics of the city-
region neoliberal growth machine model
into a coherent centric local growth frame-
work. This, in turn, suggests that with
regard to sub-national state spatial
restructuring in Wales, a different model
of economic development may well be
much better to suited to this region in ques-
tion. Our critique, then, is not just applica-
ble to Swansea Bay, but also to other
medium and smaller sized city-regions
attempting to deliver a city-region agenda.
The transference of the city-region as a geo-
political policy footprint for economic
growth (Jonas and Moisio, 2016), therefore,
needs to be more carefully thought through
in its implementation. Its usage, whereby, a
city-first or urban centric model is deployed
without a dominant agglomerative centre,
becomes mired in the difficulties of the
more complex and diverse economic
geographies.
The growing pre-eminence of the ‘city-
region’ as the de facto spatial political unit
of governance for economic development
(Clarke and Cochrane, 2013) has been a
global trend in urban and regional develop-
ment planning (Harrison, 2014). This trend
has seen attempts to implement city-region
governance arrangements around a metro-
politan core in order to foster economic
growth via agglomeration. With the
increasing popularity of this approach as a
policy for economic growth, the spreading
of the city-region growth machine can be
seen as a policy transfer (Peck and
Theodore, 2015). With any transference of
policy, it is transformed by its mobility and
delivery in a new place. In this paper, we
consider the implications of moving and
applying the city-region concept to a
medium-sized city and whether such an
application of a spatial and governmental
policy is appropriate when the central city
in question is not necessarily economically
dominant or connected to its wider region.
This raises the wider question that within
the process of sub-nation state restructur-
ing, how can the city-region construct deal
with its application in what are often poly-
centric city-regions.
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The subnational restructuring of the UK
state via the production of city-regions has
now been in progress since the 2010
Coalition Government. This has seen a pri-
mary focus on English city regions, but this
has also been applied in distinctive ways in
devolved nations of the UK with the devel-
opment of city regions in both Wales and
Scotland. In this paper, we focus upon the
case of the SBCR, based in South West
Wales, looking through the lens of Welsh
devolution and through the concept of
the city-region as a scalar narrative for the
delivery of economic development. In the
UK, this has been led by the UK
Government, as they have sought to
reshape the ways in which economic
development takes place and although this
shift in governmental delivery began under
New Labour. It was much vaunted by the
UK Coalition Government (Deas, 2013),
subsequently by the continuing
Conservative administration (Conservative
Party, 2015). This policy trajectory has
found a presence in Wales too, with the
two Welsh city-regions (Cardiff and
Swansea) both gaining city-deals via the
UK and Welsh governments.
The process of city-deal making though
is one that seeks to enable elite actors to
deliver economic growth within the respec-
tive city-region (Waite et al. 2013; O’Brien
and Pike, 2019). This raises several interest-
ing empirical and theoretical concerns with
Figure 1. Swansea Bay City Region.
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regard to the implementation of sub-
national economic policy in the wake of
devolution and austerity (Waite, 2015;
Etherington and Jones, 2016; 2018). In
this paper, we suggest that the use of the
city-region for driving growth in the UK
and with regard to Swansea Bay stretches
the concept beyond its useful application.
This is because, as a concept for delivering
economic growth in Wales (Beel et al., 2018;
Blackaby et al., 2018), the fit of the city
region concept to Swansea Bay pushes the
very dynamics of the economic model in
question to its limits. This is questioned
via comprehending how the scale and dif-
ferences across the SBCR (see Figure 1)
stretch the spatial construct to its limits,
Swansea as a smaller, geographically
peripheral UK metropolitan centre lacks
economic dominance over a city-region
that is polycentric in nature. This means it
struggles to embed the dynamics of the city-
region neoliberal growth machine model
into a local growth framework. This sug-
gests, with regard to sub-nation state
restructuring in Wales, a different model
may well be much better to suited to the
region. This critique is not just applicable
to Swansea Bay but to other medium and
smaller sized city regions attempting to
deliver a city region agenda. The transfer-
ence of the city region as a geo-political
policy footprint for economic growth
(Jonas and Moisio, 2016) therefore needs
to be more carefully thought through in
its implementation. Its usage, whereby, a
city-first or urban centric model (O’Brien
and Pike, 2015) is deployed, becomes
mired in the difficulties of the more com-
plex and diverse economic geographies city
regions have when there is not a more dom-
inant urban centre.
To address our wider conceptual argu-
ments with regard to city-regions, as well
as the implementation of the SBCB, the
paper is organised in three sections.
The paper first develops further some of
the conceptual arguments with regard to
city-region building, to situate Swansea
within its nuanced contexts. The second
details the SBCR within the City Deal
Approach being deployed by the UK and
Welsh Governments. The third section
looks at the emerging caveats and critiques
of this approach to local and regional eco-
nomic development in this part of South
Wales.
The city-regional world revisited
With the city-region becoming the domi-
nant discourse in urban development
policy and the appropriate scale on which
economic actors can position themselves
within the global economy as ‘scalarly’
sufficient to react to changes, we have sug-
gested throughout this paper that agglom-
eration tendencies privilege economic
growth on centralised urban areas. Here,
the consensus relates to the idea that if
you centralise as much of your economic
activity as possible, greater economic
returns follow from spatial proximity and
in turn, cumulative causation can operate
(see Nathan and Overman, 2013; Overman
and Venables, 2007). The city-region model
has thus shaped economic growth policy as
a metropolitan scale concern that lends
itself to the critique of ‘metrophilia’ – the
‘sweeping tendency’ to present cities as pan-
aceas for a myriad of economic and social
challenges, in the process ignoring the needs
of ‘marginalised strata’ within the city and
of ‘non-metropolitan places’ beyond the city
(Waite and Morgan, 2018: 384).
The critical approach to metrophilia is
useful in the context of this paper as it high-
lights the way in which despite the vaunted
‘bespoke’ nature of the city-region building
process, it is underpinned by a city-first
agenda, which places far more emphasis
on the importance of the urban. This in
the context of some city-regions may posit
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some forms of success, but as this policy
framework is applied to ever more varied
cities and regions, the underpinning
approach becomes much less applicable
and plausible. The economic rationale of
defining city-regions by their ‘functional’
or ‘natural’ economic area draws attention
to the need to also examine the spaces of
economic and social flows vis-a-vis travel to
work areas (TTWA) around the city-region.
This can sometimes cross pre-existing and
historic administrative and cultural bound-
aries, as well as reflect the different spatial
structures of settlements and the geogra-
phies of urban and rural economic
growth. In the case of Swansea Bay, as
the paper will develop, as a medium-sized
city in an enlarged geographical city-region,
it lacks the agglomerative pull economically
to make the city-region function as for
example Storper (2013) would suggest.
This means that due to weak economic
ties alongside a polycentric makeup of
other settlements such as Llanelli,
Carmarthen, Neath, and Port Talbot, the
city-region model for economic growth is
both ill-conceived and ill-fitted in its appli-
cation upon Swansea Bay. This does not,
however, stop the process of city-region
building taking place, in what Haughton
et al. (2016: 356) would suggest is informed
by ‘decontextualized economic theory that
uses abstract economic laws to develop
problematic policy prescriptions focused
on the assumed potential of large cities to
generate growth’. Haughton et al. are
taking aim at agglomeration as a model
for growth directly as well as the city-
region concept more broadly and it is
within this critique that we see parallels to
the SBCR’s attempt to implement and har-
ness such policy concepts. This follows with
Waite and Morgan (2018) above, in that the
city-region concept is mistakenly being
applied as a ‘panacea’ for a series of eco-
nomic problems. This means, it is ill
equipped to actually address them, namely
to fit the pre-existing geography or to pro-
vide any real ‘inclusive growth’ (see Lee,
2019); in many respects, through agglomer-
ation, it has the potential to exacerbate
uneven development.
Swansea Bay City Region and
City Deal
The city-region as a policy construct for
economic development is built on a variety
of factors that attempt to institutionalise an
agglomeration economy over time and
across space. The opportunity to territori-
alise this city-region came through city
deals, which create a bounded ‘SBCR, but
in doing so, also create the conditions for a
series of contradictions and tensions within
this mode of state intervention. These ten-
sions reflect the relatively small economic
foot print of Swansea, as the metropolitan
centre in a wider a region (see Figure 1), but
also refuel the difficult and competitive
geographies of the Welsh state, whereby
the two primary cities of Wales (Swansea
and Cardiff) are relatively close in geo-
graphical proximity, contain collectively
the largest proportion of the Welsh popula-
tion, and have historically been deeply com-
petitive with each other (see Gooberman,
2017). This makes delivering a sub-nation
state structure for Wales and particularly
South Wales difficult. Therefore, piecing
together that perceived sense of scale for
Swansea Bay is difficult, as it is required
to stretch into a rural hinterland and it is
constrained to the east by the Cardiff
Capital Region (CCR) and its own econom-
ic footprint.
The SBCR consists of the four local
authority areas that make up what could
loosely be called ‘South West Wales’. The
city-region therefore includes Pembrokeshire,
Carmarthenshire, Neath and Port Talbot
and Swansea itself, with the latter two being
more distinctively rural. This urban/rural (see
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Figure 2. Urban/rural Wales (Welsh Government, 2008).
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Figure 2) split between the local authorities is
considerable and the economic footprint of
Swansea itself, as the metropolitan centre
across the region is relatively small.
Using TTWA data as a proxy for the
economic connectedness of the city-region,
Swansea has relatively weak connections to
its rural hinterlands. Figures 3 to 5 high-
light this picture, suggesting that there is
little in the way of flow between Swansea
and the rural parts of Carmarthenshire and
Pembrokeshire itself. There is little travel
between these local authorities to Swansea
for work, alongside there being relatively
weak infrastructure connections (whether
road or rail) to even facilitate this, which
over time has significant impact on patterns
of economic development and settlement
growth. This is reflected in Figure 3,
which highlights the flows of people travel-
ling to work across the region, here
Swansea does see higher number of people
travelling in from the surrounding local
authorities (LAs) but it also sees a consid-
erably higher flow of people travelling east
for work out of Swansea. This is reflected in
the overall figures for Swansea, whereby
there is only a net inflow of þ8400 people
for work (Swansea Council, 2020). When
this is placed alongside Figure 4, showing
average commuting times into Swansea, it
shows how rapidly commute time increases
as distance from the urban centre increases,
with large parts of the city-region being well
over an hour in commuting time. Figure 5
then further represents this and the
Figure 3. Swansea travel to work flows.
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Figure 4. City-region travel times.
Figure 5. South Wales travel to work areas.
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polycentric nature of the city region as the
dominant patterns of travel largely map
onto the LA footprint. The TTWAs there-
fore split into a series of commuting pat-
terns that do not suggest the city of
Swansea has a substantial pull upon its sur-
rounding locales.
This reflects an economic reality of the
city-region with areas possessing very dif-
ferent economies and, therefore, somewhat
divergent economic interests. This variable
picture at the local authority level is also
reflected in the descriptive statistics for the
city-region (see Table 1), which suggest fur-
ther the lack of economic dominance for
Swansea as metropolitan centre. This in
part reflects an urban/rural split and
paints a mixed picture for the city-region,
whereby there is reduced employment in
Swansea and less businesses per 10,000
people in Swansea and Neath and Port
Talbot (NPT) (with higher populations)
but there are higher incomes in the more
urban local authorities, and Swansea
achieves a higher gross value added
(GVA) per head than its surrounding local
authorities.
This is compounded by a relatively weak
economic performance for the city-region
as a whole, when compared to the rest of
Wales and the UK. Using Welsh
Government (2019) statistics, it has the
lowest employment rate (71.1%), the
second highest unemployment rate (4.4%),
the highest inactivity rate (21.7%), the
lowest GVA per head (£17,600) and the
lowest gross disposable household income
(GDHI) per head (£15,600). As these fig-
ures are then broken down into LA areas
(see Tables 1 to 3), a mixed picture of both
convergence and divergence of metrics is
apparent. Table 1 shows how Swansea has
marginally weaker levels of employment
with moderately better levels of GVA per
head. This does perhaps point towards a
weak agglomeration effect for the city of
Swansea when compared to the wider city
region but one that is marginal at best.
The lack of economic dominance is fur-
ther highlighted when looking at the city-
region’s business profile, in terms of firm
size, employment and types of industry
(see Tables 2 and 3). Here, Swansea does
have a larger labour market, with more
businesses and bigger employers but it is
only a moderate difference when compared
to rest of the city-region. In the context of
these figure, the TTWA, the aforemen-
tioned urban/rural split and Swansea’s rel-
atively weak economic performance as a
city, collectively, this highlights how the
city of Swansea is a non-dominant econom-
ic centre of the city-region. This therefore
raises questions about the applicability of
the city-region approach for SBCR in
terms of economic development. The
underlying mechanism for growth, in a
city-region as posited by the UK
Government is by harnessing the positive
externalities of agglomeration (a highly
questionable premises in itself, see
Haughton et al., 2014 and 2016), in a















Pembrokeshire 71.9 5.6 22.1 18,400 457.30 644
Carmarthenshire 73.1 3.1 21.5 15,900 495.70 560
Swansea 68.3 4.9 21.3 19,300 506.90 454
Neath and Port Talbot 72.7 4.0 22.1 16,200 586.70 363
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more polycentric context like SBCR, this
seems an unwieldy fit.
It is upon this mixed and varied econom-
ic picture that the city deal was negotiated
between the four local authority areas, the
UK Government and the Welsh
Government (see Figure 1). This presented
a complicated process for negotiation and
much like the CCR City Deal (see Beel
et al., 2018) was a product of tensions
between local authorities and the Welsh
State in the context of potential local gov-
ernment restructuring plans, alongside ten-
sion between the Welsh and UK
Governments in terms of delivering the
city-region concept (see Pemberton, 2016).
The delivery of the city deal was proceeded
by the Swansea Bay Transition board,
which was led by the Sir Terry Matthews
(a leading private-sector elite and Wales’
first billionaire) and this initiated as a pro-
cess of city-region building by the Welsh
Government (Swansea Bay City Region,
2016). The initial plans were based on the
ambitious concept of an Internet Coast to
secure 5G digital capability for South Wales
and bring about an upward shift in the pro-
ductivity capability of Swansea’s advanced
manufacturing base through ‘catapulted’
technology. The SBCR City Deal docu-
ment, signed in March 2017 (HM
Government, 2017), though reflected the
product of negotiations between the Local
Authorities themselves over their immediate
(rather than forward looking) priorities and
the UK Government over what was permis-
sible Treasury expenditure at that time.
This complicated deal-making structure,
alongside the economic geography of
Swansea Bay, therefore, greatly reflects
Table 2 Firm size and related employment number (Welsh Government, 2019).
Micro (0–9) Small (10–49) Medium (50–249) Large (250 þ) Total
Enterprises by size band
Pembrokeshire 14,090 560 120 210 14,980
Carmarthenshire 14,505 600 160 290 15,555
Swansea 18,405 755 225 445 19,825
Neath Port Talbot 6890 365 130 210 7595
Employment by size band
Pembrokeshire 23,500 9900 5600 9400 48,500
Carmarthenshire 25,200 10,600 7300 18,700 61,800
Swansea 28,700 13,800 10,200 41,200 93,900
Neath Port Talbot 11,700 6400 6900 16,500 41,400






















Pembrokeshire 4500 4300 5300 18,200 600 500 700 5400
Carmarthenshire 5700 9900 5500 18,900 1300 700 1100 7600
Swansea 200 7600 8000 30,700 2900 5300 1800 16,900
Neath Port
Talbot
200 9600 4200 11,600 500 400 900 4200
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what was delivered and supports the claims
made above by Scott that ‘city-regions are
always at the same time conditioned by idi-
osyncrasies related to local material, social,
and cultural circumstances’ (Scott and
Storper, 2003: 574).
In summation, the SBCR City Deal
secured £1.3bn of funding for its 11 pro-
posed projects, whereby £637m was pro-
jected to be leveraged finance from the
private-sector and with the Welsh and
UK governments having committed in
principle to £241m of that total. The city
deal further aims to deliver a ‘collective
focus’ for the city-region. The signed ver-
sion notes that:
The City Deal provides clarity of purpose,
consistency of approach and absolute
focus on collective action over the next
two decades. We aim to tackle the struc-
tural challenges holding back our econo-
my and reduce the gap between our per-
formance and the rest of the UK in terms
of wealth creation to the benefit of both.
(Swansea Bay City Region, 2016: 2)
The deal was to be implemented over the next
15years, aiming to boost the regional
economy by £1.8bn and generate almost
10,000 new, high-quality jobs. It was split
into four main themes: Internet of Economic
Acceleration; Internet of Life Science & Well-
being; Internet of Energy and Smart
Manufacturing. These four themes were then
further split into 11 different projects, of
which, only three operate across the city-
region scale as a whole (see Figure 6).
The lack of operation across the city-
region as a whole highlights the lack of eco-
nomic convergence, as well as the need, in
political terms for each local authority, to
see some aspect of the deal landed in their
area for the purposes of political legitimacy.
Despite this, the deal makes clear that it is
about ensuring economic growth for the
city-region and widening its economic
footprint:
The Deal provides an opportunity to con-
tinue tackling the area’s barriers to eco-
nomic growth through: developing higher
value sectors and higher value employ-
ment opportunities to match; increasing
the number of businesses within these sec-
tors to widen the economic base; and
improving the region’s GVA level against
the UK average. As well as taking forward
Figure 6. The Swansea Bay City Deal (2016).
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programmes to drive economic growth the
City Deal commits local leaders and part-
ners to implementing effective leadership
across the City Region. (Swansea Bay
City Region, 2016: 3)
The deal, therefore, attempts to improve a
struggling city-region economy following
specific markers of success such as GVA
uplift. It attempts to do this via attracting,
or creating in situ, high-end businesses pri-
marily related to health, improving digital
infrastructure and in the specific regenera-
tion of parts of Swansea’s urban core.
Quite a city-regional stretch:
Emerging critiques
The above SBCR City Deal, despite the
bombast and optimism of local elites
involved in its implementation, papers
over a number of structural and strategic
weaknesses within the South Wales econo-
my and its ‘geo-constitution’ (Wills, 2016).
Not least pertaining to a breakdown in the
governance of the city deal implementation
itself due to gross misconduct, which
resulted in several high-level suspensions
from public office and later criminal inves-
tigations by the Regional Crime Unit for
Southern Wales over the misuse of public
money to support private business interests
in the controversial Llanelli Wellness and
Life Science Village project.1 These were
ongoing during the period of our research
and are outside the scope of this paper, but
needless to say they do not support the
argument that devolution through localist
city-region building represents a role
model of democracy, the basis for civil soci-
ety awakening, or virtuous economic and
social renewal more broadly. The scope of
this paper is not the governance of the
SBCR City Deal per se, but with the
deeper concern with applying the city-
region framework and its limits.
Conflicting aspirations
As has been alluded to, the city-region has
been negotiated between a set of conflicting
aspirations, which are presented via each of
the key institutional actors’ concerns as to
what they wish to see developed from the
city-region building process. This is
reflected in the views of the Welsh
Assembly’s Economy, Infrastructure and
Skills Committee who suggest that:
It is clear that Deals and the investment
that follows them have given the UK
Government a role in economic develop-
ment that (as a devolved area) would nor-
mally be the preserve of the Welsh
Government. If this joint working is har-
monious, then there is strong potential for
it to benefit all parties. However, there is a
history of fractiousness and finger-pointing
between the two governments, particularly
when it comes to economic development
and infrastructure projects in areas where
devolved responsibilities are not 100%
clear. (Economy, Infrastructure and Skills
Committee, 2017: 18–19)
From this grounding for conducting and
delivering city deal, a deal that keeps all
groups happywas always going to be difficult
and is always going to require significant
compromise. This especially pertinent in
terms of thinking through what sort of eco-
nomic growth is wanted and who does it ben-
efit. For example, there are differing
legislative approaches to economic develop-
ment from the UK andWelsh Governments,
and for the UK Conservative Government
there is an emphasis on ‘city-first’ agglomer-
ative growth. This fits well with perhaps what
local elites in Swansea would emphasise as
important too, as it places emphasis on the
city itself and the search for urbanwealth cre-
ation. Whereas the Welsh Government
(Labour), although not ideologically against
agglomeration per se, supports an alternative
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ideological model of economic development,
predicated more on achieving spatial justice
(see Jones, 2019; Jones et al., 2020; Welsh
Government, 2015a) via the Wellbeing of
Future Generations Act (2015). This is
reflected in the below quote:
I guess strategically where we were and in
the four months of negotiations strategical-
ly we had to fulfil the ambitions of both
governments and as you say you’ve got a
Labour Government here, a Conservative
Government in Westminster, so we had to
have the capability really of knowing what
both governments’ agendas were and how
to marry those two agendas and we’re still
doing it post-negotiation. We still have to
marry two strategic ambitions together but
I guess it helps that officials from Welsh
Government and UK Government can
come to an agreement themselves and
have one path forwards. (Interview, Local
Government Leader, 2018)
This implies the need to integrate the desires
of both Governments in terms of what they
consider to be appropriate economic growth,
but it also positions the divergent rural and
urban local authorities away frommore long-
term strategically planned approaches. As we
suggested above, local political legitimacy
becomes important. This is because for the
city-region as a whole, partners are required
to deliver a deal, which they derive some form
of benefit from. This, in turn, localises policy
away from city-region wide projects and con-
cerns, which are unable to be integrated with
local territorial concerns. This, in empirical
terms, also points to the need to consider
the dynamics of ‘metrophilia’, which we
now turn to examine.
Dealing with metrophilia
You’ve got an opportunity here as a
region, Swansea is known globally now
because of the football, you’ve got to use
that brand to reach out to the world to
attract people to come here.’ He said,
I think that was accepted. And on top of
that then, if you accept Swansea is ’As
much as we would like to describe
Carmarthenshire and Pembrokeshire and
all the other great areas within the region,
Swansea is your brand. That’s why it’s
Swansea Bay.’ the engine of the region,
the major urban centre, the major eco-
nomic centre of the region, then if you
get the engine running well you are going
to disperse that wealth out into the other
parts of the region. (Interview, Local
Authority Leader, 2018)
The logic of the above local authority
leader, gets to the nub of the point –
‘Swansea is your brand’ – not the ‘South
West Wales City Region’ or any other
name, but Swansea itself is front and
centre. The emphasis is also made on the
city being the major economic and urban
centre, in short the metro-centre for
making the city-region ‘work’. The quote
also highlights the belief in a trickledown
effect from the development of Swansea
itself but as has been noted, the weak eco-
nomic ties of the city-region and the
unevenness of agglomerative growth sug-
gest that this will be a struggle to provide
growth across the city-region. This argu-
ment is shared by actors in the region:
Now Pembrokeshire was not keen on the
city-region approach I think because of
our experience of city-regions. When
we’re sitting on the periphery of it the
Region looks very different sitting in
West Wales than it does sitting in
Swansea. So, if you’re sitting in Swansea
the City Region Deal looks like a pretty
good thing, but we’re a long way from
Swansea. (Interview, Civil Society
Leader, 2018)
Beel and Jones 13
The positioning here of Pembrokeshire as
the most peripheral (and rural) to
Swansea is key to the discussion and the
comprehension of what a city-region econ-
omy will bring. For the SBCR, then, this is
the ‘construal’ (Jessop, 2016a) within the
city-region building narrative; that for
underperforming and smaller metropolitan
centres, any form of trickle-out to the rest
of the city-region is highly unlikely to sur-
face. Metrophilia is clearly not the answer
here for ensuring city-region wide economic
and social development. This is further
compounded by genuine rural development
question for the city-region and the argu-
ments rehearsed in North Wales also
apply to the SBCR (see Beel et al., 2019
as well as Ward, 2006; Harrison and
Heley, 2015) with the rural parts of SBCR.
As we have noted above (Figure 1), a
large proportion of the region can be
defined as rural and this has minimal eco-
nomic connection to Swansea itself. It also
presents itself with a series of other and dif-
fering development needs. The quote below
highlights this in terms of health:
Well we’re very, very concerned about it.
Whilst the City Deal will concentrate on
health and life science as a major invest-
ment, rural health is not being taken care
of . . . It’s also got the issue of attractive-
ness, we’ve got this shift from rural areas
into urban areas which leaves a vacuum
then in terms of skills and the linguistic
skills in that rural area so health is a grow-
ing issue . . .That’s where I believe an
English city-region has got the advantage
in that it is an urban area, good commu-
nication links, high volume of people,
good learning resources distributed. We
haven’t got that; we’ve got this rural
aspect, which is difficult. (Interview,
Former SBCR Board Member, 2018)
Within the city deal, there are a variety of
projects that look to develop aspects of the
city-regions health economy, but the spe-
cific rural needs are not addressed. Added
to that, the above participant highlights a
growing issue for rural areas due to the
emphasis on projects that are urban, this
in turn, creates the reverse of agglomeration
in rural areas, as people leave. Interestingly,
the SBCR does not differentiate its policy
interventions along rural and urban lines.
Again, the overly metro-centric focus is
not the answer to rural problems, as it
also exacerbates them.
Austerity and financialisation
Further problems are aggravated by the
ongoing impact of austerity and the ques-
tion as to how the city-region will be sus-
tainably financed. Austerity has landed
differently in Wales to England, with the
Welsh Government buffering some of the
impact, but this has still impinged on
Welsh Local Authorities severely. In the
quote below, the continuing effects of aus-
terity against the local authority is even
cited as reason to not continue with the
city-region process.
We were going into a time of. . .well we’re
in a period of austerity, we cannot afford
extra expenditure on things that are not
known. This was, to me, was opening the
doors—could be a series of unknowns, so
I was very, very, very cautious, yes. . .I go
back to my point at the beginning; in these
days of austerity we’ve not got the funds.
We are being cut back, cut back, cut back
for the last five, six years. And we
shouldn’t, councils should not be relied
upon as a charity for business expansion.
There are programmes that are grants, if
your business plan stacks up, there are
banks that will lend you money. What
I’m saying is, I think, that the Assembly
and the English Government could
be . . . forming their own bank, if you
like, just allowing businesses to borrow
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cheaper money. That’s the only reason
that these schemes want in on this because
it’s borrowing cheap money, they can’t get
it the same rates from the banks or the
private sector so of course they want a
part of it. (Interview, Local Authority
Leader, 2018)
Here, the interviewee links the two projects,
city-region building and austerity together,
but also more fundamentally questions the
role of what a local authority should be
doing in relation to supporting business.
This highlights the Janus-faced nature of
city-region devolution in England. Against
a backdrop of austerity, based on these
insights, a similar devo-dynamic is in play.
This is further reflected in an uneasiness
surrounding the financing of city deal too
and the risk each local authority faces in
supporting it (in the wake of austerity).
Below, the discussion as to whether the
city deal is based on ‘capital or revenue’ is
illuminating, particularly as to how
stretched local authorities are and the
actual value placed on the city deal.
According to one perspective:
And then there’s the issue around what is
the nature of the funding in the City Deal,
if you read it, it says two different things;
on one page it says that it’s “funding”, so
that could be capital or revenue, over the
page it says it’s capital. Now I need reve-
nue for one or two of the projects so I’m
asking them to clarify, essentially. They
started off saying it’s all capital and I said,
“oh dear”. And now they are starting to
back-track a bit, so it’s all part of the nego-
tiation. We’ve got a revenue requirement of
thirty-four million quid, on two main proj-
ects, one of which is here and the other one
is the regional skills programme and a few
bits and pieces elsewhere, but basically
there’s a deliverability issue around the proj-
ects if we can’t get the clarity. (Interview,
Local Authority Official, 2018)
For the local authority official, the city deal
being financed via capital funding is unten-
able, due to the upfront cost of project
delivery. The vagueness in the city deal
documents does not help and in turn, with
stretched resources, has meant the need to
negotiate further before the deal can be
implemented, and this is a stark reality of
negotiating the city-region building process.
Here, austerity and the process of negotiat-
ing the deal between multiple actors and the
requirement of the state to support busi-
nesses with funding, raises a series of diffi-
cult questions for the on-going
implementation of the city deal.
Trickle-out . . .
The possibility of around £1.3 billion in
funding being available for investment
does offer a number of opportunities to
deliver the projects in the SBCR City Deal
and this level of funding is, of course,
attractive to private investment. Therefore,
as the local authority leader below suggests
the scale, of this interest is genuinely global
in its offering:
I think the investment from both govern-
ments is just giving us the profile that pri-
vate sector want to invest and it’s the cat-
alyst. Because both governments want to
invest in the region. We’re already seeing
global investors wanting to talk to us . . .
there are companies talking to us now that
we’ve never seen in Carmarthenshire but
they’re here now because of the City Deal
and what that offers and that’s great to
see. (Interview, Local Government
Leader, 2018)
Questions remain as to whether the proj-
ects, as outlined in the city deal, will have
the level of economic impact city-region
actors suggest, but with such ‘global’ exter-
nal interest, another fundamental question
opens up. How much of the proposed £1.3
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billion investment will remain in the city-
region, to be appreciated by the regional
civil society of the Swansea Bay? For
some, this is another failing of city-region
building process itself, whereby not enough
attention has been concentrated on city-
regional welfare-capture, to influence the pol-
itics of distribution thereafter. According to
one source:
I had probably three or four objectives the
biggest one being fair procurement.
Probably the second one a voice for con-
struction and hopefully probably lining up
with yours localism as well. I wanted to
get the local point across that construction
is the first rung on the ladder when it
comes to investment and so
on . . .Obviously a lot of people didn’t
agree with my views. I did bang on all
the time about procurement and it
needed to start with Smart Fair
Procurement but I’ve written there that
was totally lost to be honest with you. I
couldn’t get it written into the City Region
Deal and I think that’s the most impor-
tant. The enabler for the whole of the
City Region Deal is the construction so
whether or not the project is on infrastruc-
ture or it’s on life science, wellness centre
as one is or it’s on the city centre regener-
ation it starts with construction.
(Interview, Former SBCR Board
Member, 2018)
The above quote highlights how as a Board
Member participant within the process of
developing the city-region, there is an
inability to guarantee that the funding
coming to Swansea Bay will remain with
its economy. Again, this highlights a further
critique to the city-region policy construct
as it is currently premised; this spatio-
temporal fix cannot find ways to ensure
that, even if it creates an agglomerative
effect from investment, investment may
not necessarily remain within the city-
region crucible. This instead represents a
form of trickle-out, whereby infrastructure,
new buildings and so on maybe built, but
with an increasingly fragmented or even
‘dismembered’ (Toynbee and Walker,
2017) local state, little of its economic foot-
print will ultimately remain in the city-
region.
Conclusions
You could call it the hegemony of a laissez
faire – the neo-liberal hegemony. To use
that phraseology: it’s the dominant philos-
ophy, isn’t it? And I don’t think that has
been challenged. You’ve got Jeremy
Corbyn and John MacDonald coming in
but even there I suspect that’s more about
macro-economic policy and it really
strikes me again that, in my experience
of politicians, they know very little about
this area so they tend to assume what
(hacks it) in terms of economic develop-
ment is big buildings and roads, some-
thing tangible. I come back to my point,
in economic development terms in Wales
there’s too much development and not
enough economics. (Interview, Health
Board Chair, 2018)
This paper has sought to expose the
immense difficulties of instituting a city-
regional model of economic and social
development for the SBCR, which is a col-
lection of polycentric medium-sized urban
entities, historically battling for recognition
as nodes in the increasing globalisation of
capital networks. We have highlighted the
pre-existing economic tensions in this local-
ity of South Wales, namely an agglomera-
tive economy riddled with weak links and
connections within and between the towns
and cities. The city deal does nothing short
of replicating and extenuating these eco-
nomic and social problems. Overtime, the
local authority and city-centric dominated
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strategy has led to the lack of a city-region
wide spatial strategy, with emphasis being
placed on too many geographically discreet
projects, which are used to both secure
political legitimacy and also partially plug
the gaps left behind by the decade of aus-
terity. In the words of one influential aca-
demic commentator:
Dylan Jones-Evans . . . reportedly said that
the deal had gone away from “investing in
infrastructure and people” towards
“building more buildings”. He argued
that the strategy taken had “been discred-
ited by economic development organisa-
tions around the world”. Professor
Jones-Evans criticised the deal for
moving away from funding and skills for
business by no longer having an infra-
structure or investment fund and claiming
that less than 1% of the budget specifically
earmarked for skills. In addition, he
argued that the emphasis on new digital
technologies, which was at the heart of
the proposition document, had been cut
back to a single funded project. Most wor-
rying, he argued, was the absence of any
funding to support the proposed installa-
tion of a new transatlantic cable from
North America into Oxwich Bay. This
project, Professor Jones-Evans argued
“has the potential to totally transform the
economic fortunes of the whole of South
Wales”. (quoted in House of Commons
Welsh Affairs Committee, 2019: 19)
Within this context of political capture by
certain local state elites, Figure 7 captures
the current (August 2020) status of the
SBCR City Deal projects. Essentially, three
projects in the original vision (Centre of
Excellence in Next Generation Services,
Factory of the Future and Steel Science)
have been replaced by the Supporting
Innovation & Low Carbon Growth project
in the Neath Port Talbot area.2 Economic
development officers within the supporting
local authorities are at pains to point out
that steel science and smart manufacturing
elements are now contained within the
Supporting Innovation & Low Carbon
Growth project. Critics though point to this
being more about protecting the initially allo-
cated funding parameters and safeguarding
the interests of steel production in Port
Talbot than providing the basis for increased
economic productivity and shared prosperity
across the SBCR.
Figure 7. The Swansea Bay City Deal (2020).
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As the city-region building ‘round of
institutional investment’ (Peck and Tickell,
1995), then, has been rolled-out over this
existing complex geography, we would
argue that in years to come, this (curtailed)
model of economic development will indeed
exacerbate combined and uneven develop-
ment, and furthermore it will not lead to the
empowerment of civil society actors to be
able to ‘formulate an agenda, act and make
change’ (Wills, 2016: 13). This raises ques-
tions with regard to what an appropriate
‘growth’ strategy would be for places like
the Swansea Bay. As a final note, these
issues have been further exacerbated by
the COVID-19 crisis, whereby, the very
model of urban agglomeration is thrown
into question. In this context and with
potential changes in terms of where and
how we work, is a more decentralised, poly-
centric region actually more of a benefit for
future theorisations of economic growth?
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